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 What lessons do historical examples of blockades and commerce raiding provide 
for the creation of a general naval economic warfare framework for modern 
policymakers?  This research study examines the implementation of naval economic 
warfare strategies over the past 150 years in order to explore this topic.  Four case 
studies of naval economic warfare are analyzed: the Union blockade and Confederate 
commerce raiding in the American Civil War from 1861-1865, the German submarine 
campaign of World War 1 from 1914-1918, the United States’ submarine and aerial 
campaign against Japan from 1941-1945, and the Tanker War between Iran and Iraq 
from 1980-1988.  Each case study is broken down into three analytical areas: the naval 
context, the strategy employed, and the results attained.  From these case studies a 
general framework for modern policymakers is derived based on the connected factors 
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 While an integral aspect of the 20th century concept of “total war”, economic 
warfare as a military strategy has existed for millennia.  The capture of trade outposts, 
interdiction of supply lines, and sieges of cities have all served the purpose of degrading 
an enemy’s ability to wage war through economic means.  In modern parlance, 
economic warfare has grown to encompass more than direct military operations, 
including the implementation of unilateral or multilateral sanctions or embargoes 
enforced more through legislation than physical interception.  However, modern 
militaries still use their assets for what I term “kinetic economic warfare”, in which 
through destruction of economic means (or the threat thereof) states seek to achieve 
strategic objectives in wartime.  A modern example of kinetic economic warfare is the 
destruction of port facilities, transit hubs, and pipelines in order to reduce or prevent 
enemy imports and exports. 
 As long as the majority of commerce relies on maritime routes, economic 
warfare will be conducted against these assets.  This generally takes the form of either 
commerce raiding or blockades.  The former, commerce raiding, is often referred to as 
“guerre de course”, or “war of the chase” in naval theory.1  Commerce raiding is defined 
as the interdiction and destruction of merchant shipping by naval or aerial assets in a 
targeted but often somewhat ad-hoc basis, possibly as part of a broader blockade effort 
and often far from enemy shores.   
 
1 Elleman and Paine, pg. 1 
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A blockade, according to the United States Navy’s The Commander’s Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations, is “a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of 
all states, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or 
coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy State.”2  Thus, 
unlike commerce raiding, a blockade has a specific geographic focus, namely the 
ingresses and egresses of an enemy’s naval and aerial assets, be they military or civilian 
in disposition.  Blockades typically fall under two categories: close and distant 
blockades.  Close blockades involve the investment of naval assets in the proximity of 
the state and ports being blockaded, whereas distant blockades have naval assets 
deployed far from the enemy coast enabling greater flexibility and concentration of 
resources.3   
This leads to the focus of this research study, which seeks to analyze naval 
economic warfare strategies over the past 150 years and extract consistent themes to 
derive a framework for modern actors on a regional and global level.  Specifically, the 
case studies examined will involve the use of organized military formations to conduct 
blockades and commerce raiding.  For the purposes of this paper, “naval economic 
warfare” will refer to maritime economic warfare strategies implemented in the interest 
of degrading an enemy economy to achieve a broader strategic objective. 
 
2 Commander’s Handbook, 7-10 




 The second half of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century 
represented a watershed moment in naval theory, with multiple influential individuals 
leaving their mark on the international maritime community.  Theorists from Great 
Britain and the United States, the former the preeminent global naval power and the 
latter an emerging contender, espoused strategies which focused on the battle fleet as 
the fundamental tool of maritime warfare.  French theorists on the other hand, seeking 
to circumvent the Royal Navy’s quantitative superiority, concentrated on developing 
strategies to counter the inherent strengths of large industrial powers and their 
commensurately strong battle fleets.  Opinions regarding naval economic warfare were 
diverse, with some considering it of minor importance while others arguing it was the 
fundamental purpose of waging maritime war. 
One of the key figures of classical naval theory is Alfred Thayer Mahan, an 
American naval officer who published multiple works on naval history and strategy in 
the late 19th and early 20th century.  His ideas regarding fleet engagements and the 
necessity of naval power had widespread impact on the development of large navies 
into World War I, with his works influencing as far as Japan.  Mahan was a strong 
proponent of developing a powerful battlefleet to wrest control of the sea away from an 
adversary; he argued that this control was key to states acquiring and maintaining 
power.  As such, his views are biased towards fleet operations which require the mailed 
fist of large warships.  It is no coincidence that in the 1890s as Mahan’s theories were 
receiving widespread acceptance among world governments, there was a concerted 
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push towards building larger, more powerful capital ships.  Fleets were constructed 
around the idea of a “decisive battle” in which one navy was utterly destroyed as a 
fighting force by the other.  Indeed, the idea of the “decisive battle” and the importance 
of the fleet have had considerable endurance well past Mahan’s death in 1914, with 
even modern thinkers regarding Mahan as influential.4 
 While espousing the importance of decisive engagements and the construction 
of warships necessary for such battles, Mahan did not emphasize targeted naval 
economic warfare as a worthwhile function of naval assets.  In one of his seminal works, 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Mahan compares France and 
Britain to the Union and Confederacy in the American Civil War.  In both cases, he 
argues that the deciding factor in warfare between those actors was significant 
investment by the enemy battle fleet, not the economic warfare strategies 
implemented.  He claims, referring to the economic consequences of blockades: “[s]uch 
injuries, unaccompanied by others, are more irritating than weakening.  On the other 
hand, will any refuse to admit that the work of the great Union fleets powerfully 
modified and hastened an end which was probably inevitable in any case?”5 
 Mahan goes further, arguing that a degradation in the enemy’s economic 
circumstances is mainly an externality of his favored tactic, complete control of the sea 
achieved through “decisive battle”.  He states:  “It is not the taking of individual ships or 
 
4 Holmes, James R., PhD, and Kevin J. Delamer. "Mahan Rules." U.S. Naval Institute. May 01, 2017. 
Accessed July 13, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/may/mahan-rules. 
5 Mahan, pg. 128-129 
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convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the 
possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from 
it…”6  Mahan thus considers naval economic warfare to be at best a secondary goal for 
powerful navies to pursue, as the economic externalities of simple control of the sea will 
more than suffice in this regard.  Clearly, Mahan’s thinking is at odds with the idea of 
developing and implementing a specific naval economic warfare strategy. 
 While the transition from the late-19th century to the early-20th century was the 
era of Mahan, his views on naval economic warfare were by no means universally 
accepted.  On the other side of the Atlantic, British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett 
published his Some Principles of Maritime Strategy in 1911, shortly before the start of 
World War 1.  Corbett starts from much the same standpoint as Mahan in that the 
ultimate goal of naval power is to be able to wrest control of the sea from a theoretical 
adversary.  However, Corbett strictly differentiates “control” in naval terminology from 
its land-based equivalent.  A state, outside of territorial waters, simply cannot 
comprehensively control an area as broad as the open ocean from in the same manner 
as territory on land.  Corbett adds that a state cannot permanently deploy forces to a 
given patch of open sea for a significant amount of time due to logistical and mechanical 
restrictions.  Instead, the purpose of sea control aside from resources like fishing, 
Corbett argues, is to maintain a state’s own lines of communication and to deny that 
same ability to the enemy.7 
 
6 Ibid 
7 Corbett, pg. 93 
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 Extrapolating from his basic definition of sea control as a means to transmit both 
civilian and military communications (which in Corbett’s usage also applies to 
transportation of goods and materials), he moves on to discussing the practical and 
moral reasons that naval economic warfare is a worthwhile strategy.  Corbett’s 
reasoning is as follows: controlling commerce is already an accepted practice in land 
warfare during the occupation of territories and population centers, which morally 
legitimizes the equivalent obstruction of commercial transit by a naval blockade.8   
Having established naval economic warfare as a morally valid aspect of naval 
warfare, Corbett next examines its importance to naval strategy.  In doing so, he 
diverges significantly from the Mahanian viewpoint of decisive battle being the main 
objective of naval forces.  Corbett states that, should a state destroy an enemy’s battle 
fleet the enemy “will be but little the worse.”9  Corbett further proposes that if the 
enemy is a land power, then the naval strategy of decisive battle has done almost 
nothing to diminish their control over their territory.  According to Corbett, then, one 
cannot expect to win a war by only destroying the naval forces of the enemy.  He 
instead argues that the only way to translate maritime control into strategic victory is to 
make loss of sea control affect the “commerce and finance” of one’s enemy.10  In his 
eyes the “primary method… in which we use victory or preponderance at sea and bring 
 
8 Ibid, pg. 98 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid, pg. 99 
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it to bear on the enemy's population to secure peace, is by the capture or destruction of 
the enemy's property, whether public or private.”11 
As classical naval theorists, Mahan and Corbett clearly have nigh-diametrically 
opposing views on the validity of naval economic warfare as a strategy, apart from their 
agreement on the necessity of sea control.  For Mahan, the purpose of a navy is entirely 
the destruction of the enemy’s navy, which he argues is a goal that is entirely self-
evident.  With the removal of the enemy naval threat, the Mahanian view dictates that 
sea control is secured and victory achieved.  Corbett, on the other hand, counters that 
this does little to actually ensure complete victory over the opponent apart from 
facilitating a subsequent amphibious invasion.  Instead, Corbett emphasizes the 
deprivational aspect of naval economic warfare as the primary means to translate sea 
control into military victory. 
Around the same time that Mahan and Corbett were proposing theories 
regarding large fleets, a competing school of thought was established in the Jeune École 
in France.  One of the foundational figures of the Jeune École was Captain Louis-Antoine-
Richild Grivel, who published De la guerre maritime avant et depuis les nouvelles 
inventions (Maritime war before and after the new inventions) in 1869 proposing naval 
strategy in light of new innovations in naval technology during the 19th century, like the 
steam engine and ironclad vessels.12  Grivel agrees with Corbett on naval economic 






instead of the “maritime butcheries” between large naval formations, it is instead the 
financial implications of naval war that force an enemy to sue for peace.13  Thus, Grivel 
proposes naval economic warfare as a suitable strategy not only if a state attains naval 
supremacy but regardless of sea control.14  With this revolutionary idea, Grivel catalyzed 
the later establishment of the Jeune École in the French navy in the late 19th century. 
From a theoretical standpoint, then, the Jeune École represented an alternate 
path to naval warfare for countries which could not compete with the largest naval 
powers in terms of naval construction.  Juxtaposing themselves against Great Britain as 
a theoretical adversary, French naval theorists of the Jeune École focused on Great 
Britain’s critical weakness as a colonial power: dependence on overseas supply lines for 
resources and commerce.15  Gabriel Charmes, an outsider with a keen interest in the 
changing naval context of the late 19th century, proposed the fundamental Jeune École 
view on commerce raiding as part of a comprehensive naval strategy for a second-tier 
naval power like France.16  A critical factor in Charmes’ strategy was the recent 
development of the torpedo boat which theoretically enabled even small ships to 
destroy large military and civilian vessels on an individual basis.  Self-propelled 
torpedoes carried massive warheads without requiring a commensurately large gun, 
thus making small warships a powerful threat.  These torpedo boats could be mass 
produced with significantly fewer resources than battleships or cruisers.  The form 
 
13 Ibid, pg. 254 
14 Roksund, pg. 5 
15 Roksund, pg. 9 
16 Ropp, pg. 158-164 
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factor of torpedo boats of the era factored into Charmes’ thinking for more than just 
economic reasons, though.  He pointed to the theoretical danger of operating such a 
small warship in the commerce raiding role as catalyzing a shift in commerce raiding 
tactics that would become manifest in World War 1. 
According to Charmes, in the past commerce raiding was generally performed 
with an eye towards humanitarian concerns, with the crew being evacuated off the 
targeted ship before it was sunk.  However, “tomorrow”, Charmes predicts, “…an 
autonomous torpedo boat-two officers, a dozen men-meets one of these liners carrying 
a cargo richer than that of the richest galleons of Spain and a crew and passengers of 
many hundreds…”, a situation which makes the evacuation of crew and passengers 
practically impossible for the torpedo boat.17  Interdicting the larger vessel and 
attempting to redirect it to a friendly port would be fraught with difficulty, too.  
Charmes describes the likely situation: 
“To this declaration… the captain of the liner would respond with a well-aimed shell that 
would send to the bottom the torpedo boat, its crew, and its chivalrous captain, and 
tranquilly he would continue on his momentarily interrupted voyage.  Therefore the 
torpedo boat will follow from afar, invisible, the liner it has met; and, once night has 
fallen, perfectly silently and tranquilly it will send into the abyss liner, cargo, crew, 
passengers; and, his soul not only at rest but fully satisfied, the captain of the torpedo 
boat will continue his cruise.”18 
Charmes’ description of commerce raiding is, in hindsight, quite prescient.  The size 
disparity between commerce raider and commercial vessel would be a key 
consideration in World War 1, especially with the widespread introduction of the 
 
17 Ibid, pg. 165 
18 Ibid, pg. 165 
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submarine.  The vulnerability of a submarine on the surface dictated that attacks must 
be accomplished without warning, ideally while submerged, in order to reduce the risks 
to the crew. 
 Ultimately, Jeune École theorists like Charmes and his ideological doppelganger 
Admiral Théophile Aube established a framework that wildly diverged from the 
battlefleet advocacy of Mahan and Corbett.  While Mahan and Corbett saw the 
battlefleet as accomplishing the majority of naval objectives in wartime, be they set-
piece battles or control of shipping and communication lanes, Charmes and Aube 
considered the development of the self-propelled torpedo and the torpedo boat to be 
the arbiter of a fundamental shift in the realities of naval combat.19  The Jeune École 
theorized that, in a war between navies of differential power, the weaker fleet would 
act as a “fleet-in-being” and avoid direct combat with its superior foe.  At the same time, 
the threat of torpedoes would prevent the superior fleet from capitalizing on its 
advantage in warships.  Thus, for the Jeune École the only actual naval warfare in the 
modern era would be economic warfare.20 
 Clearly, classical naval theorists did not agree on the merits or implementation of 
naval economic warfare strategies.  The early 20th century would end up being a proving 
ground for their theories, though, and the experiences of World War 1 and World War 2 
would heavily color later theorists on the utility of naval economic warfare and its 
position within modern naval strategy. 
 




 Post-World War 2, naval economic warfare appears to have taken something of 
a backseat in general naval theory.  Dr. Bernard Brodie, in the fifth edition of his work A 
Guide to Naval Strategy, barely mentions the offensive aspect of naval economic 
warfare, simply noting that naval warfare “exerts military-economic pressure on the 
enemy” by obstructing imports and exports, as well as interfering with coastal shipping 
and ground transportation.21  While this is true, Brodie does little to further analyze the 
methods and situations best suited for naval economic warfare in either blockade or 
commerce raiding.  Brodie provides, however, an entire chapter devoted to the defense 
of convoys against commerce raiders; this ignores the perspective of a navy that seeks 
to conduct commerce raiding.  Published in 1965, Brodie’s fifth edition is clearly 
oriented towards the threat of nuclear war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and is 
written for a Western perspective in which maritime commerce was something to be 
defended, not attacked. 
 Even in the late 20th century, this Cold War mindset was still reflected in naval 
economic warfare theory.  Hugh F. Lynch’s article “Strategic Imperatives: Economic 
Warfare at Sea” has an entire section devoted to a theoretical global conventional war 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, although in this case viewed through the lens of 
economic warfare.  Lynch argues that, due to the intrinsic nature of the Warsaw Pact as 
a large alliance with shared borders, the Warsaw Pact is more likely to conduct 
commerce raiding than NATO.22  While his analysis makes sense, this scenario is 
 
21 Brodie, pg. 14 
22 Grunawalt, pg. 251 
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outdated by roughly 30 years and has little relevance for 21st century policymakers.  
Lynch also includes a section on “limited” wars between non-superpowers but focuses 
mainly on the legal aspects of defending neutral shipping and less on how regional 
adversaries might actually conduct naval economic warfare.23 
 In the post-Cold War period, Christopher McMahon published a comprehensive 
look at the pros and cons of commerce warfare in 2017 in his article “Maritime Trade 
Warfare: A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?”  McMahon concisely delineates the 
positive and negative arguments regarding the use of guerre de course in a modern 
context, noting that there is no existing United States naval doctrine regarding the 
conduct of naval economic warfare in either blockades or commerce raiding, nor much 
discussion about its utility in a modern conflict.24  Much like Brodie and Lynch, 
McMahon’s position is primarily United States-centric, but in doing so he notes some 
clear vulnerabilities in the American naval structure that could be leveraged by an 
opponent including a lack of strategic depth in its reserves of merchant and logistical 
shipping.25  McMahon concludes by expressing the importance of further application of 
historical lessons by policymakers from both an offensive and defensive standpoint in 
order to better prepare for the possibility of naval economic warfare in the future. 
 Geoffrey Till’s fourth edition of Seapower: a Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 
published in 2018, devotes a section to discussion of offensive action against 
 
23 Ibid, pg. 254-259 
24 McMahon, pg. 23 
25 Ibid, pg. 34 
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commercial shipping.  Till echoes McMahon’s statements regarding the lack of emphasis 
on direct naval economic warfare in modern Western doctrine.26  He proposes that this 
absence is derived from a general view that broad conflicts are unlikely in the current 
era as well as the more complex nature of commercial shipping in a globalized 
economy.27  However, Till points out that the political and legal obstacles to naval 
economic warfare can be overcome should there be sufficient need as well as the 
existence of key vulnerabilities for East Asian countries regarding commercial shipping 
routes, in particular China’s “Malacca dilemma” and its exploitation by theoretical 
adversaries.28  Thus, Till presents a relatively ambiguous view towards the future 
importance of naval economic warfare from a targeted, large-scale offensive standpoint, 
and instead highlights the importance of naval activities like antipiracy operations in 
securing the conditions for free maritime trade.29 
 This paper aims to fill this gap in the current literature regarding naval economic 
warfare.  Much of the post-World War II theory either ignores large-scale offensive 
naval economic warfare operations or is outdated by focusing on the context of the Cold 
War.  More relevant pieces focus primarily on the American point of view, to the 
detriment of other global and regional actors, or prioritize low-intensity operations.  As 
McMahon notes, it is vital for policymakers to understand if large-scale naval economic 
warfare should be conducted, and if so, how best to undertake this strategy.  In the 
 
26 Till, pg. 365 
27 Ibid, pg. 367 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid, pg. 370 
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interest of accomplishing this task, this research study seeks to use historical lessons to 
establish a general framework which can be applied to a variety of conflict scenarios. 
Research Question/Methods: 
 The fundamental question this study seeks to answer is: what are consistent 
conditions for success in naval economic warfare, and can they be formed into a guiding 
framework for modern policymakers when considering the execution of naval economic 
warfare? 
In the interest of answering this, this study will examine four case studies of 
naval economic warfare which include blockading, commerce raiding, or a combination 
of the two.  These case studies have been selected because of the methods used by the 
combatants.  The first, the Union and Confederacy in the Civil War, is an example of a 
close blockade over an extremely long coastline with elements of blockade running and 
commerce raiding throughout.  The second, Germany’s commerce raiding campaign 
against Britain in World War 1, represents the use of surface and submarine commerce 
raiders without augmentation from aircraft.  The third, the United States against Japan 
in World War II, demonstrates the use of submarines and aerial mining to accomplish at 
first a distant blockade with commerce raiding, which then evolved into a close blockade 
by the end of the Pacific campaign.  Finally, the Tanker War during the Iran-Iraq war is 
indicative of an extended commerce raiding and close blockade strategy between two 
regional powers in the modern era using a combination of fixed and rotary-winged 
aircraft, surface vessels (mainly Iran), anti-shipping missiles, and shore-based artillery 
15 
 
positions.  All four represent the use of organized military forces to accomplish strategic 
maritime economic warfare objectives within a broader conflict. 
 Each of these case studies will be broken down into their naval context, the 
economic warfare strategy used, and the results from that strategy’s implementation.  
After analyzing the four case studies, this paper will then apply this analysis to four 
consistent themes which form a general naval economic warfare framework.  These are 
the broader context of a given conflict, the naval economic warfare strategy applied, the 
military assets available either at the onset of naval economic warfare or in the near 
future, and how the naval economic warfare strategy interfaces with the strategic 
objectives of the combatant.  A key priority of this research study is to establish a 
framework that avoids being constrained by a particular technological or historical 
context as exemplified by much of the existing literature regarding naval economic 
warfare.   
Data  
Case Study 1: The United States Civil War:  Union Blockade and Confederate 
Commerce Raiding 
Naval Context: 
 The Union blockade of the Confederacy in the Civil War started with President 
Lincoln’s statement on April 19, 1861 enacting a blockade of states south of South 
16 
 
Carolina, amended eight days later to include North Carolina and Virginia.30  At the time, 
the United States navy was a small force, with a total of 42 warships in commission, 16 
being sail-driven and 26 steam-powered.31  The Confederate navy was even smaller; at 
the time of secession only 10 warships, with a total of 15 guns, had been seized from 
the Union.32  In order for the Union to implement a blockade and for the Confederacy to 
contest it shipbuilding needed to be prioritized.  This is evident in the size of the Union 
navy’s blockade flotilla by January 1865; 471 warships were assigned to blockade duty 
out of some 700 commissioned throughout the Civil War.33  Over the same period, the 
Confederacy commissioned over 210 vessels including floating batteries.34  Over the 
course of the Civil War, the technological context shifted from mainly wooden warships 
with either steam or sails for propulsion to a mixed fleet of unarmored and ironclad 
screw-driven steam vessels.35 
Strategy: 
 The Union blockade took well over a year to fully establish, despite officially 
starting in April 1861.36  Over 3,500 miles of coastline needed to be patrolled, thus 
requiring a significant increase in both shipbuilding and basing.  The lack of wireless 
communication necessitated a “close” blockade, in which Union warships remained in 
the general proximity of the shoreline and ports that they were blockading.  By 1862, 
 
30 Davis and Engerman, pg. 111 
31 Soley, pg. 243 
32 Ibid, pg. 25 
33 Davis and Engerman, pg. 116 
34 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies ser.2:vol.1, pg. 23-25 
35 Soley, pg. 244-250 
36 Davis and Engerman, pg. 111-116 
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Union strategy had become more flexible to better fit the tactical requirements of such 
a large operation.  Instead of withdrawing ships from the blockade line for repairs, the 
Union created a coordinated policy with army units occupying Southern coasts to create 
bases of operation; this greatly improved logistics for the Union navy.37 
 At the same time, the Confederacy sought to both break the blockade and 
interfere with Union merchant shipping in order to draw resources away from the 
blockade and negatively impact the Union economy.38  The Confederacy implemented a 
policy of commerce raiding using both commissioned vessels and privateers, a necessary 
mix due to the stark industrial situation facing the Confederate navy.39  Over the course 
of the war, the privateers were either captured or destroyed by the Union navy or 
converted into blockade runners to better address the economic impacts of the Union 
blockade.  Confederate naval representatives in Europe were able to commission a total 
of 18 cruisers, of which seven became commerce raiders and the remaining 11 blockade 
runners.40  These warships were fast, wooden, and generally lightly armed. The 
commerce raiders were then tasked with attacking Union commercial shipping on a 




38 Elleman and Paine, pg. 73 
39 Ibid, pg. 74 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid, pg. 86 
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 The Union blockade, though slow to develop, ended up having a significant 
impact on the Confederacy.  While blockade runners were able to penetrate the Union 
cordon throughout the war, they did so with steadily decreasing success, from one in 
ten blockade runners being intercepted in 1861 to one in two in 1865.42  Roughly 1,500 
Confederate vessels were captured or destroyed by the blockade, representing at least 
$31 million dollars (in 1865) of lost property when combined with their cargoes.43   
From an economic standpoint, the blockade had an array of effects.  One of the 
most critical was the constraining of cotton exports.  The blockade runners, designed 
more for speed than for cargo capacity, could not export nearly as much cotton as the 
prewar South was able to, with estimates ranging from a reduction of 80 to 86 percent 
of the Confederacy’s prewar exports.44  At the same time, this reduced capacity and the 
inherent incentive to maximize profit versus risk led to what Mark Thornton and Robert 
B. Ekelund call the “Rhett Butler effect”, in which blockade runners imported luxury 
goods despite the Confederacy’s need for essentials like iron and machinery which had a 
lower ratio of profit per pound.45  By the end of the war, the Confederate public had 
severe difficulties buying necessities while still being able to acquire luxury items.46  The 
Union blockade contributed to a rise in inflation as well.47  Although even at the height 
of the Civil War blockade runners were able to bring thousands of weapons and millions 
 
42 Davis and Engerman, pg. 113 
43 Ibid, pg. 113 
44 Ibid, pg. 154 
45 Thornton and Ekelund, pg. 40 
46 Ibid, pg. 55 
47 Davis and Engerman, pg. 113 
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of pounds of goods like meat and lead, the broader effects of the blockade in 
conjunction with poor Confederate economic policy contributed to the ultimate defeat 
of the Confederacy in 1865.48  Critically, the Union was far better able to weather the 
financial burden of maintaining the naval blockade than the Confederacy was able to 
withstand the stress of being blockaded. 
The Confederate commerce raiders, while nowhere near as comprehensive as 
the Union blockade, had startling tactical successes.  The CSS Alabama captured or sank 
64 Union ships on its own, sailing 75,000 miles in the process.49  The commerce raiders 
caused millions of dollars of damage to Union shipping and tied up dozens of Union 
warships in attempts to hunt them down, an effort which cost the Union several million 
more dollars by itself.50  Ultimately, the Confederate commerce raiding effort sank over 
100,000 tons of Union shipping and increased insurance rates.  A greater impact, 
though, was the flight of Union shipping to foreign registries; this deprived the Union of 
nearly 800,000 tons of shipping or more than half of the commercial shipping available 
to the Union during the Civil War.  While clearly successful in imparting a 
disproportionate impact on the Union economy, the Confederate commerce raiders 
were unable to achieve their ultimate strategic objective of forcing the Union to sue for 
peace. 
Case Study 2:  German Submarine Commerce Raiding in World War 1  
 
48 Ibid, pg. 113, 158 





 After the start of World War 1, the German navy was in a disadvantaged position 
compared to the Allies.  The British surface fleet had quantitative superiority on its own; 
even more so when combined with the French and Russian navies.  Seeking the 
Mahanian decisive battle was not a realistic strategy for achieving sea control, especially 
when the British navy enacted a policy of distant blockade which significantly lessened 
the ability of German surface torpedo craft to augment German surface strength.51  
Initial surface battles like Heligoland Bight in 1914 revealed inadequate response time 
for the High Seas Fleet and exacerbated the German fears of losing expensive surface 
assets for little gain.  Germany had implemented the Etappe system of surface 
commerce raiders, but apart from the Emden these were generally unsuccessful despite 
the revolution in wireless communications that had taken place in the preceding 
decade.52  Germany was forced to look to submarine assets for its guerre de course 
campaign against the Allies.  The German navy had 28 U-boats of all types at the 
beginning of the conflict and quickly implemented a large research and construction 
effort to expand the U-boat fleet’s capabilities. 
Strategy: 
 The first German U-boat efforts were piecemeal individual strikes against both 
military and merchant shipping, resulting from technological limitations, numerical 
limitations, and the lack of existing precedent for submarine warfare.  The success 
 
51 Ibid, pg. 136 
52 Ibid, pg. 136-137 
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witnessed by these raids, which were able to avoid British surface combatants, 
compelled the German navy to take submarine operations more seriously.53  The 
practical issues of warning merchant ships before striking (as predicted by Charmes in 
the 1880s) catalyzed the implementation of “unrestricted” submarine warfare in early 
1915 around the British Isles, with the exception of part of the Dutch coast and the 
eastern North Sea.54  While Germany procured dozens of U-boats during this period, 
fears of international retaliation against the unrestricted campaign compelled German 
leadership to limit U-boat operations to the North Sea by the end of 1915, operating 
under restrictive “cruiser rules” in which merchant ships were notified of impending 
attack before being sunk primarily with gunfire, not torpedoes.55  This ended the first 
German submarine guerre de course campaign, although U-boats operating under 
“cruiser rules” continued to attack merchants through the end of 1916. 
 In January 1917, proponents for a return to unrestricted submarine warfare 
convinced German command that reimplementing that strategy would end British 
participation in the war within five months, well before any American reprisals could 
realistically impact Germany.56  Now numbering over 100 U-boats, the German U-boat 
fleet began its second unrestricted guerre de course, which would carry through to the 
end of the war. 
Results: 
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 Both the 1915 and 1917-1918 unrestricted submarine campaigns had a 
significant impact on Allied merchant shipping.  The first campaign resulted in the 
sinking of 1.29 million tons of shipping, although this was counteracted by British 
construction of 1.23 million tons and capture of 682 thousand tons during the same 
period.57  It is important to note, however, that had the unrestricted campaign been 
maintained into 1916, the lack of additional merchant ship captures and the declining 
economic and material situation in Britain might have led to strategic success before 
American intervention and the development of antisubmarine warfare tactics could 
swing the balance back in the Allies’ favor. 
 The second campaign, from 1917-1918, was ultimately no more successful from 
a strategic standpoint despite sinking significantly more merchant vessels.  U-boats were 
able to sink hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping a month through October 1918, 
with Britain alone losing over 5 million tons of merchant shipping over this period.58  
British imports fell by 20 percent from 1916 to 1917, but the American declaration of 
war against Germany in April 1917 (which was catalyzed by the unrestricted commerce 
raiding), rationing, increased domestic British food production, and the development of 
new antisubmarine tactics like convoys prevented the campaign from achieving its 
ultimate goals.59 
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 Thus, the German guerre de course of World War 1, while achieving remarkable 
tactical success, was ultimately unable to force Britain out of the war and arguably 
further hurt Germany by convincing the United States to join the Allies.   
Case Study 3:  United States submarine warfare against Japan in the Pacific, World 
War 2 
Naval Context: 
 The crippling or destruction of key American naval assets at Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941, along with the capture of southeast Asian and island bases through 
early 1942 gave Japan a quantitative and qualitative advantage in the Pacific theater.  
American naval forces were further hampered by the necessity of splitting their focus 
between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans.  From an economic standpoint, the 
Japanese home islands were entirely reliant on outside resources imported via 
merchant shipping.  The deficiencies in surface combatants and basing as well as the 
strategic and logistical considerations of fighting a two-front war meant that 
unrestricted submarine warfare was one of the only suitable tactics for American forces 
at the start of World War II to degrade Japan’s ability to wage war and would remain so 
for several years.  Development of large, long-endurance submarines like the Gato-class 





 American pre-war strategic planning against Japan was encompassed by War 
Plan Orange, which dictated that the American fleet proceed “westward through the 
Marshalls and the Carolines, consolidating as it goes, and then on to the recapture of 
the Philippines.”60  The plan called for the “eventual economic starvation” of Japan, 
indicating that even before the issues imposed by Pearl Harbor the US navy was 
planning economic warfare against Japan.61  CNO Admiral Stark additionally expressed 
concerns that proceeding directly to the Philippines would be inadvisable, citing 
extensive German training as a key factor in their success against Norway and 
advocating that the US take a similar approach.62  Should the United States find itself in 
a two front war, as was eventually the case, Stark proposed imposing an economic 
blockade on Japan while concentrating on supporting Britain in the Atlantic against 
Germany.63  Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Stark issued the command to commence 
“against Japan unrestricted air and submarine warfare.”64 
 When the United States became militarily involved in World War 2, these 
policies were generally complied with.  President Roosevelt espoused the belief in July 
1942 that Germany’s defeat would lead to the downfall of Japan; on the other hand, 
Japan’s defeat would do little towards victory against Germany.65  Under these 
conditions, the American submarine force was ideally suited to fulfilling the “Plan DOG” 
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espoused by CNO Stark where other American assets were either quantitatively or 
qualitatively insufficient or deployed to the Atlantic.  As Germany did not have a large 
surface or merchant fleet by this point in the war, American submarines were of little 
utility in the Atlantic theater. 
 While American submarine bases were relatively few in number, interwar 
technological development created submarine classes which had the necessary 
endurance to adopt a distant blockade in the form of a sustained guerre de course 
against Japan.66  Tactics and weaponry, however, were initially unsuitable for combat in 
this manner.  Many submarine commanders proved unable to handle combat stress, 
and American torpedoes had inherent design flaws which mitigated numerous 
otherwise successful attacks during the first few years in the Pacific.67  Additionally, 
strategic indecisiveness regarding the role of submarines saw their efforts divided 
amongst myriad insubstantial roles like supporting guerillas and transporting military 
staff.68  Despite these early problems, the American guerre de course continued to 
accelerate into 1944.  By this point, the glaring faults were generally mitigated and a 
combination of new tactics, closer basing, more submarines, and improved torpedoes 
revolutionized American submarine warfare.69  By the end of 1944, aircraft could finally 
be based close enough to Japanese merchant lanes to augment, and then supplant, 
submarine efforts primarily with aerial mining operations.70 
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 Initially, American submarine economic warfare in the Pacific had only a 
marginal impact on Japanese shipping.  At the start of 1943, despite sinking over 650 
thousand tons of Japanese merchant shipping, total Japanese merchant capacity had 
only diminished by 185 thousand tons, augmented by shipbuilding and capture of 
foreign ships.71  However, over the next two years the situation quickly changed.  In 
1943, over 1.34 million tons of shipping were sunk by submarines, and over 2.45 million 
tons were sunk the following year.72  While it is important to note that the submarine 
effort was part of a combined arms strategy involving aircraft, mines, and surface 
vessels, the submarines still accounted for the majority of Japanese merchant shipping 
sunk during the Pacific campaign.  Out of the total 7.91 million tons of commercial 
shipping destroyed by the United States, 4.78 million tons (about 60 percent) was 
claimed by submarines.73 
 The effects of this campaign are clear to see when looking at Japanese economic 
metrics.  Forced to devote whatever remaining capacity to only the most essential 
goods, coal and iron imports had virtually ceased by March 1945.74  At the same time, 
Japanese steel production was forced to concentrate on only the highest-priority items 
like shipping, which left little for military equipment like tanks and almost nothing for 
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civilian goods.75  Oil importation was eliminated by April 1945, placing massive 
constraints on Japanese training and mobility.76  The Japanese economy was virtually 
crippled by this point. 
 The American submarine campaign against Japan, while taking months to 
manifest, ended up being arguably the most successful implementation of naval 
economic warfare in modern history.  Especially when supplemented by aircraft and 
mines later in the war, Japanese industry was severely impacted; this was one of the 
most important factors contributing to the Japanese defeat in 1945. 
Case Study 4:  The Tanker War during the Iran-Iraq War  
Naval Context: 
 During the Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988, neither side was able to deliver a 
decisive blow against the other on land.  This inevitably led to the expansion of the war 
into the maritime theater, as both Iran and Iraq relied on shipping for economic and 
military support.  At the start of the war, Iran had a small navy that had been built up 
under the Shah to include eleven larger surface combatants (like upgraded Allen M. 
Sumner class destroyers and Thornycroft Mark 5 Frigates) as well as nineteen smaller 
warships.77  These were augmented by hundreds of land-based fixed and rotary-winged 
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1979 Revolution.78  Iraq, on the other hand, had only a handful of small patrol craft, but 
boasted 16 Aerospatiale Super Frelon helicopters capable of launching Exocet missiles 
which would prove critically important in the Tanker War.79  Much like Iran, however, 
the rest of Iraq’s aircraft were neither equipped nor trained for anti-shipping duties.  
Both sides would be forced to rely on shore-based artillery and missile installations to 
supplement their maritime attack capabilities. 
Strategy: 
 Owing to the material limitations on both sides, the Tanker War generally 
consisted of missile and rocket attacks delivered by Iraqi and Iranian aircraft, shore 
installations, and Iranian naval assets.  Both sides declared Gulf maritime exclusion 
zones (GMEZ) early in the war in order to protect friendly shipping, although these 
zones were often used for targeting, especially by Iraq.80  During the first few years of 
the conflict, attacks on merchant shipping were a relatively small aspect of the broader 
war, with Iraq executing the majority of the attacks.81  Around forty merchant ships 
were struck, mainly by Iraqi helicopters, and 23 were either sunk or written off as 
constructive total losses (CTL).82  Iran resorted to convoying merchant ships to its own 
ports, while Iraq relied on third parties like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as proxies. 
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 By 1984, the Tanker War expanded in both geographical and strategic scope for 
both sides as Iraq received French fixed-wing aircraft with the capability of firing Exocets 
and Iran began to use land-based attack aircraft with repurposed air-to-surface missiles 
and unguided rockets.83  Iran was at a technological disadvantage in the air as their 
weapons were limited to daytime operations only, whereas the Exocets could be guided 
by solely internal inertial and radar guidance.84  Out of 68 ships attacked (49 by Iraq and 
19 by Iran), 35 were either sunk or declared CTLs.85  Attacks continued by both sides 
through 1985 and 1986, with the main method of attack shifting decisively towards 
fixed-wing aircraft-launched Exocets for Iraq, and Iran still using a mix of fixed and 
rotary-winged aircraft as well as naval forces.  Attacks reached their apex in 1987 and 
continued through the end of the conflict in 1988. 
Both sides expanded their GMEZs throughout the war in order to better degrade 
the other’s economic capabilities and justify their attacks on neutral shipping. 86   Mines 
also saw significant use, primarily by the Iranians as they had access to the Strait of 
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 Ultimately, both sides in the Tanker War, either through sinking or writing off 
more than 100 vessels, destroyed roughly half the tonnage of merchant shipping sank 
by both sides in World War II.88    40 million tons of shipping were damaged and more 
than 400 ships were attacked, with total economic costs estimated at roughly 1.2 trillion 
dollars.89   Iraqi Exocets were by far the most important weapon in the conflict, 
representing nearly 75 percent of all ships sunk by both sides.90  Shipping firms 
responded by reflagging vessels and relying on third-party convoying, while insurance 
companies raised rates for commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf.  Ironically, this 
incentivized some Gulf shipping routes as companies perceived a financial gain from the 
increased fees and cheapened Iranian oil.   
Neither side was able to achieve their strategic goals in the conflict, as Iraq did 
not retain control over any Iranian territory and Iran could not collapse Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.  However, had the conflict persisted, it is possible that Iraq’s effort 
might have forced Iranian concessions.  Iran’s economy seems to have been harder hit 
than Iraq’s, as Iranian oil revenues declined 25 percent from 1987 to 1988, down to 3.7 
billion dollars, while Iraq’s oil revenue rose by 25 percent over the same period thanks 
to its relatively secure oil pipeline infrastructure.91 
 While convoys were implemented by third parties, and there was an eventual 
American intervention in the war, major involvement did not occur until 1987.  The 
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main catalysts for this were attacks on American naval assets by both Iraq and Iran, 
notably the USS Stark by Iraqi Exocets in March 1987 and the USS Samuel B. Roberts by 
an Iranian mine in April 1988.92 
Discussion: A framework for naval economic warfare  
 Based on these four case studies, what consistent factors could be used establish 
a framework for the implementation of naval economic warfare strategies?  Four key 
considerations can be derived: the context of the broader conflict (who a nation is 
fighting and relevant geopolitics), the naval economic warfare strategy used (guerre de 
course, close blockade, distant blockade, or some combination thereof), the military 
assets available, and the how naval economic warfare integrates into the overall 
strategy of the combatant. 
Contextual factor:  
Starting with the contextual aspect, understanding the adversary that the nation 
is fighting against is a critical component to successful implementation of naval 
economic warfare.  The strategy implemented, be it commerce raiding, blockading, or 
some combination of the two, must have some hope of actually impacting the economy 
of the opponent.  Taken to the extreme, it would be absurd to try to implement a naval 
blockade or commerce raiding strategies against a landlocked nation, as it is unlikely 
that they rely on their own shipping for trade and likely have no ports that could be 
blockaded.  Even some coastal areas may not be suitable for naval economic warfare.  
 
92 Elleman and Paine, pg. 246-248 
32 
 
The fundamental reason why the United States’ blockades against the Confederacy and 
Japan were so effective is that both adversaries were reliant on either maritime imports 
or exports for their wartime economies to function.  Thus, shutting off key supply lines 
and economic corridors had a real chance of degrading their ability to fight.  On the 
other hand, Iraq has coastal access but Iranian anti-shipping efforts had little effect on 
Iraq’s economy thanks to overland oil pipelines that enabled Iraq to circumvent Iran’s 
control of the Strait of Hormuz.  At its most fundamental level, then, naval economic 
warfare strategies can only be successful against adversaries that are primarily 
economically reliant on shipping.   
 The next consideration in the contextual aspect of naval economic warfare 
success is the industrial power of the adversary, as evidenced by Germany’s failure to 
starve Britain into submission in World War 1.  Simply sinking shipping is only sufficient 
to severely degrade an economy if the state does not have the ability to procure or 
produce replacements in a given timeframe; otherwise, the likely result is an increase in 
insurance rates and rationing but not economic collapse.  Despite sinking millions of 
tons of shipping throughout World War 1, the German submarine force was unable to 
accomplish its key strategic objective of forcing Britain to sue for peace.  The 
Confederate commerce raiders, while disproportionately successful against the Union, 
were unable to degrade the Union’s economy sufficiently for their efforts to be anything 
beyond a morale booster for the South; the Union was far too wealthy and had access 
to vast natural resources to supply its industry for the duration of the Civil War. 
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  Even American efforts against the Japanese took years to really impact the 
Japanese economy because their shipbuilding capacity took months to diminish after 
the official start of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific.  The better the 
adversary’s shipbuilding infrastructure and reserves of key resources like steel and oil, 
the longer it will take for naval economic warfare strategies to have a critical impact on 
the conflict.  Extrapolated from this, based on the case studies one cannot expect naval 
economic warfare strategies to be successful in short-term conflicts, as the likelihood is 
that the logistics of implementing these strategies and their impact’s temporal delay is 
going to far surpass the duration of a short conflict.  In all four case studies, the 
programs were implemented over the course of years and took many months for any 
strategic effects to be realized. 
 The final contextual consideration is the broader geopolitical environment in 
which the combatants find themselves.  Naval economic warfare strategies, especially 
those involving the detention or destruction of neutral shipping, may catalyze significant 
international reactions that could prove inimical to the goals of the country 
implementing them.  In two of the case studies (Germany in World War 1 and the 
Tanker War) their naval economic warfare programs, mainly the targeting of neutral 
commercial or military shipping, resulted in critical backlash that at the very least 
counteracted perceived gains from conducting naval economic warfare.  While it is 
possible that Germany’s first unrestricted program might have been sufficient to 
achieve strategic success had it been maintained into 1916, by 1917 the main result of 
their renewed campaign was to bring the United States into the war on Britain’s side; 
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arguably, then, Germany’s second campaign decisively lost the war for them, despite 
notable tactical successes and sinking millions of tons of merchant shipping.  In the case 
of the Tanker War, American involvement took place after naval vessels deployed to 
protect international interests were struck by the combatants.  This emphasizes the 
importance of accurate targeting, which may not always be possible if operating in an 
ISTAR-deprived environment. 
 The absence of outside intervention can be critical, too.  A key aim of the 
Confederacy throughout the Civil War was attaining recognition from European powers, 
specifically Britain and France, in the interest of having them intervene against the 
Union.  While the Confederacy was able to maintain imports and exports from Europe 
with varying degrees of success throughout the war, they failed to catalyze a European 
intervention.  Theoretically, had such an intervention taken place at the beginning of the 
war when the Union navy was at its weakest quantitatively and qualitatively, this might 
have been enough to secure independence for the South.  Instead, European countries 
simply sought other suppliers for goods like cotton and avoided becoming embroiled in 
the Civil War.  The geographic isolation of Japan from its European allies in World War 2 
also applies, as there was virtually no chance of Japan getting anything beyond nominal 
technical support from the other Axis powers.  Germany could only commit submarines 
to make supply runs to Japan, while Italy remained bottled up in the Mediterranean by 
the Allied naval forces.  Thus, Japan had to rely on insufficient domestic assets and 
production to try to break the blockade.   
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 From a general standpoint, based on these case studies, the ideal context for 
naval economic warfare to take place within is against an adversary that relies heavily 
on shipping for resources and commerce, has either or both limited industrial and 
natural resource capacity, and has few or geographically isolated international allies that 
cannot be expected to intervene on their behalf.  Regional powers must be especially 
mindful of instigating reactions from more powerful global actors. 
Naval Economic Warfare Strategy Employed: 
 After satisfying the contextual considerations for implementing naval economic 
warfare, the next critical aspect is the nature of the strategy employed.  There are three 
general strategies that can be either employed separately or fused in order to suit the 
specific goals of the nation in question.  These are commerce raiding, close blockades, 
and distant blockades. 
 Commerce raiding is the easiest to implement, as commercial shipping can be 
targeted by a number of naval and land-based assets in the modern era.  If there is a 
significant likelihood of international intervention over sinking neutral shipping, then 
“cruiser rules” should be followed whenever possible.  While this makes naval assets 
more vulnerable, it will also help mitigate the negative geopolitical externalities of 
commerce raiding against neutral shipping, as evidenced in the German World War 1 
case study.  “Cruiser rules” also facilitate the proper targeting of merchant vessels, as 
challenging the ship openly and evacuating the crew gives more opportunity to 
accurately determine the disposition and cargo of the merchant ship.  This remains true 
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in a 21st century context.  While the Automatic Identification System (AIS) attached to all 
modern commercial vessels beyond 300 tons would theoretically help with 
identification in this regard, this system can be spoofed, placing commerce raiders in a 
difficult position depending on the rules of engagement.93  Successful guerre de course, 
though highly effective when used in proper circumstances, is contingent on satisfying 
these requirements.   
 There are key strategic considerations when implementing a blockade, too.  
First, the adversary must have ports that can be realistically sealed off from the outside 
world by one’s own forces.  Although Iraq was able to target shipping and port 
infrastructure along the Iranian coast, it did not have the surface assets necessary to 
establish a blockade against Iran.  Assuming that the adversary can be blockaded, next 
one must determine the type of blockade best suited for the relevant coastline.  If the 
opponent has only a few ports that are geographically close together, then a close 
blockade would enable superior concentration of naval assets in the relevant area.  
However, when implementing this form of blockade it is vital to carefully analyze the 
littoral and coastline military assets the adversary might have access to.  The 
widespread use of antishipping missiles and drones, in addition to attack aircraft and 
small warships, makes the littoral zone a high-risk environment for even a well-supplied 
navy in the 21st century. 
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The Union was able to implement a close blockade against the Confederacy for 
two key reasons: the geographic proximity of friendly basing for servicing and repairing 
naval assets and the relatively low threat environment in which only the few 
Confederate ironclads and shore installations posed a substantial risk to Union vessels.  
Establishing or capturing territory near the blockade line is fundamental to supporting 
this form of blockade.   
 There is, however, another way to effectively establish a close blockade without 
stationing expensive naval assets within range of the adversary.  Mines, either deployed 
by air or submarine, can effectively close off a harbor due to their inherent deterrence 
factor.  Modern mines, like the Mark 60 CAPTOR employed by the United States until 
recently, have vastly improved capabilities over systems used during the World Wars.94  
These torpedo-launching mines have a standoff capacity which enhances their utility far 
beyond that of legacy contact or magnetic varieties.  Clearing minefields is a time 
intensive process, made all the more difficult by this standoff capacity as safe lanes must 
be far wider than was previously necessary with proximity naval mines.  Even with far 
more basic proximity mines, the aerial mining campaign of the Pacific campaign was 
second only to submarines in merchant tonnage sunk, while Iranian mines had some 
success in the Tanker War against large commercial vessels.  Mines, however, have the 
same intrinsic disadvantage as indiscriminate commerce raiding in that the destruction 
of neutral shipping may result in an international reaction detrimental to strategic 
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objectives; the American reaction to the Samuel B. Roberts striking an Iranian mine is 
clear evidence of this. 
 The final option is a distant blockade, like that employed by Britain against 
Germany in World War 1 or the fusion guerre de course/blockade employed by the 
United States against Japan.  This involves stationing naval assets far from the enemy 
coastline and tasking those assets to deal with targets and threats in a more 
decentralized manner.  While this is a useful strategy for preventing an adversary from 
sortieing naval surface vessels, it is inherently less effective at interdicting merchant 
shipping unless there are numerous naval assets available that can operate 
independently from larger task forces.  For the United States in World War II submarines 
were able to serve in this capacity.  Depending on the rules of engagement, drones 
could perform this same role; however, as unmanned craft, drones would likely be 
unable to evacuate crew from merchant shipping and may thus provoke a negative 
geopolitical reaction if non-combatants or neutral sailors are killed or left adrift. 
 Depending on the situation, these strategies can be fused to varying degrees, as 
shown by both the German World War 1 and American World War 2 case studies.  In 
both scenarios, submarines were used as commerce raiders and minelayers to enact 
distant blockades through destruction of shipping within a specific geographical zone.  
Over the course of the campaign, the American effort against Japan eventually would 
incorporate all three naval economic warfare strategies as the virtual elimination of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy and the shrinking Japanese-held territory transitioned the 
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American effort into a close blockade in 1945.  Thus, some synthesis of blockade and 
commerce raiding strategies is likely the best course of action if possible. 
Military Forces and Structure:  
 Another important factor in successful naval economic warfare is employing 
strategies that best suit the military force structure that is realistically available.  The 
case studies show that at least tactical, if not strategic, successes were achieved only by 
following this criterion.  For example, the Confederacy was able to employ commerce 
raiders with surprising effectiveness; they were forced into this strategy, though, by the 
inherent constraints of their lack of shipbuilding infrastructure and limited funds for 
acquisition of foreign vessels.  These few cruisers would have been entirely wasted had 
the Confederacy sought to enact a rigid blockade of Union ports as they would have 
stood little chance against the overwhelming quantitative superiority of the Union navy.  
Likewise, the German submarine commerce raiding campaigns in World War 1 were 
vastly more successful than their surface vessel equivalents as the Royal Navy had a 
significantly easier time countering a surface threat with the ships and technology 
available at the time.  Focusing additional resources on the surface component would 
have had little, if any, return on investment for the German navy; the prioritization of 
submarine production towards the end of the war indicates that the Germans realized 
this.  Iraq’s lack of naval assets and geographic reality dictated the employment of land-
based antishipping missiles, artillery, and aircraft against commerce in the Persian Gulf.   
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 There is another consideration when looking at military forces and structure as 
they relate to economic warfare, which I term “potential” assets.  If, as predicted by the 
United States leadership at the start of World War II, the conflict is likely to be long 
enough that production capacity and systems development will become a deciding 
factor, then the assets a nation can deploy a year or two down the road may have a 
critical impact on the shape and success of their naval economic warfare strategy.  As 
seen in the case studies, there is typically a noticeable lag before a naval economic 
warfare strategy can coalesce into an effective operation.  This can result from initial 
lack of assets or training as well as inadequate systems and weaponry.  Implementing 
sufficient development and production of these “potential” assets along with 
establishing the necessary combat and logistical tactics to support them, can transform 
an initially ineffective strategy into one of significant strategic impact.  The Union navy 
in the span of roughly four years went from a few dozen vessels available for all duties 
to hundreds of assets dedicated solely to blockading the Confederacy.  The realization of 
this potential morphed the inconsequential Union blockade of 1861 into a key factor in 
the defeat of the Confederacy.  Likewise, the reform of training and strategy in 
conjunction with improved weaponry and increased submarine production meant that, 
by 1944, American submarines were sinking vastly more Japanese merchant shipping 
than they had in 1942 and 1943.  Iraq was able to acquire fixed-wing aircraft with 
significantly greater capabilities than their initial rotary-wing force, enhancing their 
maritime strike capabilities throughout the Persian Gulf. 
Broader Strategic Objectives: 
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 The final consideration regarding the employment of naval economic warfare is 
the theoretical place it would take in the broader strategic goals of the conflict.  Aside 
from the aforementioned risk of international intervention from destruction of neutral 
shipping, implementing naval economic warfare itself may prove antithetical to strategic 
goals.  If limited objectives are sought, then threatening to starve a country of goods 
and resources would likely galvanize resistance and transform a limited war into 
something far broader and bloodier.  While Iran and Iraq were fighting over relatively 
small tracts of land, the Tanker War eventually provoked an international intervention 
which likely led to the failure of both sides to achieve their strategic objectives.  The 
threat of humanitarian crisis through resource deprivation may by itself catalyze 
international intervention on behalf of the adversary.  Leadership must examine the 
expected duration of the conflict, the desired objectives, and the theoretical negative 
externalities of implementing naval economic warfare.  Even if properly implemented, 
naval economic warfare’s effectiveness could prove to be a double-edged sword. 
Conclusion: Naval economic warfare in the 21st century 
 After looking at the case studies and the framework derived from them, can 
naval economic warfare still be employed by modern regional and global combatants?  
While clearly not a blanket solution, naval economic warfare will remain an important 
strategy for the foreseeable future.  The global reliance on maritime commerce will 
incentivize blockades and commerce raiding whenever feasible within the framework 
established by this paper.  However, future naval economic warfare may not be as 
destructive as indicated by the four case studies.  Distant blockading can be augmented 
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by unmanned and space-based surveillance systems, facilitating the safe redirection of 
neutral shipping away from the combat zone whenever possible and thus allowing 
kinetic force to remain a deterrent, reducing the likelihood of international intervention.  
Unmanned surface vessels, as evidenced by the United States Navy’s Sea Hunter 
program, could enable close blockades in the littoral without significant risk of human 
casualties.95  Electronic warfare could disable commercial vessels without the need to 
fire a shot, while cyber-attacks could cripple port infrastructure without bombardment.  
The naval economic warfare framework could be altered to accommodate the 
maturation of these technologies, especially risk calculations regarding international 
reactions to the targeting of neutral shipping. 
While emerging technologies may enable less destructive future naval economic 
warfare, kinetic guerre de course is likely to become a viable solution for an increasing 
number of state and non-state actors exemplified by the emerging antishipping 
capabilities of Houthi rebels in Yemen.  The Tanker War established the Exocet missile as 
the most effective weapon on either side for the destruction of commercial vessels; it is 
important to note that the Exocet was designed in the 1970s with relatively simple 
targeting and fuzing.  Its 165kg warhead was often insufficient to inflict crippling 
damage on larger merchant vessels like crude tankers displacing over 200,000 tons.96  
More modern antishipping missiles with larger warheads and more sophisticated 
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guidance would likely perform far better, significantly increasing the viability of missile-
based commerce raiding.  Additionally, current submarines with guided torpedoes are 
likely to be far more effective in performing guerre de course operations than their 
early-20th century counterparts.  There is a direct need for analysis regarding the 
construction of modern commercial vessels and the effectiveness of these kinetic 
systems in order to better assess the validity of commerce raiding for state and non-
state actors. 
Thus, while the framework established by this research study should remain 
valid well into the 21st century, future research should be conducted on how current 
and emerging technologies and weapons systems affect the conduct of future naval 




























Case Study Context Strategy Outcome
US Civil War
Generally steam-powered wooden 
and iron-hulled vessels, muzzle-
loading black powder weapons; both 
sides have initially small navies and 
require rapid shipbuilding programs 
to augment their strength
Union: "Anaconda" strategy of 
blockading Confederate 
coastline Confederacy:  
Commerce raiding to tie up 
Union resources and impact 
Union economy
Strategic Union victory: 
Confederate economy heavily 
affected by blockade and 
externalities, while Confederate 
commerce raiding has insufficient 
effect to turn the tide
German Commerce Raiding WW1
Submarines and torpedoes relatively 
mature but untested technology, 
Britain reliant on vulnerable 
merchant routes, German surface 
fleet insufficient to achieve sea 
control
Two campaigns of unrestricted 
submarine warfare targeting 
merchant shipping, fusing 
commerce raiding with 
blockade strategies
Strategic German defeat:  despite 
notable tactical success and 
millions of tons of merchant 
shipping sunk, German campaigns 
are unable to force Britain to sue 
for peace and represent key factor 
in America's entry into WW1
American Pacific Theater WW2
American surface fleet unable to 
project power after Pearl Harbor 
attacks, interwar developments in 
fleet submarines enable operations 
far from existing bases
Implementation of Plan DOG, 
submarine campaign against 
Japanese merchant shipping 
later augmented by an aerial 
mining campaign
Strategic American victory:  By the 
beginning of 1945, Japanese 
economy is crippled and is unable 
to supply critical war materials
Tanker War, Iran-Iraq War
Both sides have relatively small 
surface fleets, Iraq has rotary-winged 
aircraft capable of firing Exocet 
AShM but neither side has sufficient 
formations trained in anti-shipping 
operations in the Persian Gulf
Both Iraq and Iran target 
merchant shipping using 
whatever means at their 
disposal, with Iraq 
emphasizing Exocets and Iran 
using a variety of repurposed 
ordinance and mines
Ambiguous:  While the Tanker 
War had a broad effect on the 
region, neither side was able to 
realize major strategic gains from 





















Key Principle Contingent Factors
Broader Context of Conflict
What geographic features promote/impede the implementation of naval 
economic warfare? (Coastal features, straits, etc.)
What is the likelihood of international intervention if naval economic 
warfare is implemented? (Particularly important if regional power)
What are the enemy's economic vulnerabilities or lack thereof? (Enemy 
reliance on merchant shipping, infrastructural redundancies like pipelines)
What is the predicted duration of the conflict? (Kinetic naval economic 
warfare typically takes months to years for effects to be realized)
Naval Economic Warfare Strategy Employed
Close blockade: improved control over port ingress and egress, but asset 
intensive and exposed to littoral dangers
Distant blockade: less risk and less asset intensive, but less direct control 
over coastal shipping routes
Commerce raiding: physical destruction of merchant ships and possible 
deterrent effect, but asset intensive and increased risk of civilian and neutral 
casualties
Seek to fuse these strategies to maximize utility
Military Force Structure
What assets are available right now?  What assets can be acquired in the 
near future?
Do military forces have relevant antishipping training or experience?
How reliant are military forces on outside support to maintain 
effectiveness?
How well can military forces withstand attrition or sustained operations?
Broader Strategic Goals
Does victory require broad or limited objectives?
If limited objectives are sought, will the implementation of naval 
economic warfare hamper achieving these objectives?  (Risk of galvanizing 
enemy resistance or international intervention before objectives can be 
achieved)
How well can the domestic economy withstand the externalities of naval 
economic warfare? (Cost of deploying and acquiring assets, economic 
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